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I. INTRODUCTION
Free trade agreements (FTAs) are “one of the best ways to open up
foreign markets to U.S. exporters.”1 Aimed at “protect[ing] U.S. interests
and enhanc[ing] the rule of law in the FTA partner countr[ies],” the
agreements have the capacity to create “stable and transparent trading”
environments and have proved ostensibly popular in the marketplace, given
that a substantial percentage of the United States’ international trade takes
place with nations which has are co-parties to such agreements.2
Accordingly, the Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade
Agreement (CAFTA),3 initiated by President George W. Bush in 2002 and
later approved in 2005, “place[d] the United States in a ‘free trade’ zone with
Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Nicaragua and the
Dominican Republic” in order to “reduce tariffs, limit import quotas[,] and
increase legal protections for foreign investors.”4 Despite these intended
benefits, CAFTA, like its predecessor, the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA),5 has been roundly criticized for its role in outsourcing
jobs to nations with curtailed labor representation and unionization6 and for
allowing private corporations to undermine—or even dictate—host nations’
environmental policy choices.7 Just as legal scholars criticized CAFTA’s
environmental protection in the wake of its ratification,8 Pacific Rim Mining
Corporation (Pac Rim) has recently cited arbitration arising under NAFTA’s
investor protection provisions as precedent in order to sue the Republic of El
Salvador for disallowing the continued exploration and mining of precious

1

Free Trade Agreements, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE – INT’L TRADE ADMIN., http://trade.
gov/fta/ (last visited June 30, 2012).
2
Id. (“Forty-one percent of U.S. goods exports went to FTA partner countries in 2010,
with exports to those countries growing at a faster rate than exports to the rest of the world
from 2009 to 2010, 23% vs. 20%.”).
3
Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement, 109 P.L. 53, 119 Stat. 462
(2005) [hereinafter CAFTA], available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-ag
reements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-america-fta/final-text.
4
Don McIntosh, CAFTA Fight Boils Down to Who Will Benefit in Trade, NW. LAB. PRESS
(May 20, 2005), http://www.nwlaborpress.org/2005/5-20-05CAFTA.html.
5
North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289
(1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
6
McIntosh, supra note 4.
7
Randal C. Archibold, First a Gold Rush, Then the Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2011,
at A6.
8
See Vivian H.W. Wang, Note, Investor Protection or Environmental Protection?
“Green” Development under CAFTA, 32 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 251, 282 (2007) (“While
Annex 10-C.4(b) of CAFTA was intended to protect legitimate public welfare objectives from
being deemed indirect expropriation, nothing in CAFTA seems to change the result under
cases like Metalclad.”).
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metals within its national boundaries.9 This suit, and others like it, may not
only impact host nations monetarily, but may also generate civil unrest
throughout a region that is still recovering from a protracted era of violent
repression and internal conflict.10 The Pac Rim suit also demonstrates that
CAFTA protects foreign corporate investment at the expense of host nations’
policy-making autonomy and that CAFTA’s imbalance is most pronounced
within the environmental context.
This Note argues that CAFTA’s investor protection provisions fail to set a
reliable expropriation standard, that CAFTA lacks an adequate mechanism to
prevent forum shopping, that CAFTA environmental protection provisions
are substantively and procedurally deficient, and that these failures operate in
concert to offer overly broad protection for investment interests eviscerating
progress on environmental protection in the process. It will address the
various CAFTA provisions that enable private corporations to dictate the
environmental policies of host nations, and accordingly, attempt to respond
to recent questions regarding what may be done to counter FTAs’ chilling
effects on environmental progress generally.11 In doing so, this Note will
survey the substantive and procedural mechanisms proposed by legal
scholars to maximize the environmental policy making autonomy of
CAFTA’s host nations, as well as other relevant practices that may be
employed to achieve similar ends in the FTA context. The following
sections will discuss: CAFTA’s creation and the policy concerns expressed
leading up to its ratification, the procedural and substantive shortcomings by
which the agreement’s investor protection and environmental protection
language is marred, and what incremental changes might be made via a side
agreement in order to shore up these insufficiencies.
II. THE DISPUTE
Pac Rim acquired rights to explore El Salvador’s El Dorado mine, which
is speculated to contain a substantial amount of gold, in 2002 as result of a

9

Archibold, supra note 7.
McIntosh, supra note 4.
11
See Katie Zaunbrecher, Note, Pac Rim Cayman v. Republic of El Salvador: Confronting
Free Trade’s Chilling Effect on Environmental Progress in Latin America, 33 HOUS. J. INT’L
L. 489, 502 (2011).
How much of an incursion on sovereign authority is acceptable when
economic development and foreign trade are on the line? Should future FTAs
provide the investor-state dispute resolution loophole that allowed the
strategic maneuvering mastered by Pacific Rim/Pac Rim? And at what point
do FTAs stop paying lip service to environmental aspirations and actually
start achieving them?
Id.
10
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merger with Dayton Mining Corp., which had begun exploring the region in
the early 1990s.12 Despite Pac Rim’s eagerness to commence the extraction
process, it has yet to do so due to the Salvadoran government’s refusal to
issue exploitation permits.13 Citing an unsatisfactory Environmental Impact
Assessment, the government denied the permits because of the harm already
wrought upon the area due to earlier mining efforts and the prediction of
possible devastating effects if mining resumed.14 Of particular concern was
the risk of toxic spills associated with the company’s plan to use large
amounts of cyanide in the exploration process. The detoxification process in
case of a spill would significantly deplete the Rio Lempa river, the only
source of clean water within the area.15 By invoking CAFTA’s investor
protection language, Pac Rim filed what is essentially a regulatory takings
claim in an international investment court seeking $77 million in damages.16
This case is one of many claims brought in recent years by corporations
against Latin American nations, as foreign investors seeking to strike it big
come to the region for oil, gas, and mineral deposits.17
III. CAFTA: BACKGROUND
A. Political Concerns Surrounding CAFTA’s Passage
CAFTA, like its predecessor NAFTA, was created for the purpose of
“reduc[ing] tariffs, limit[ing] import quotas and increas[ing] legal protections
for foreign investors.”18 CAFTA was seen, at the time of its negotiation, as
an incremental step towards then-President George W. Bush’s “ultimate goal
of a Free Trade Area of the Americas . . . that would potentially include
thirty-four economies within the Western Hemisphere.”19 Despite the
President’s enthusiasm and the United States Trade Representative’s

12

Krista Scheffey, Pacific Rim v. El Salvador and the Perils of Free Trade in the Americas,
COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS (July 30, 2010), http://www.coha.org/pacific-rim-v-el-sal
vador-and-the-perils-of-free-trade-in-the-americas/.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Archibold, supra note 7.
17
Id.
18
McIntosh, supra note 4; see also Paulette L. Stenzel, Free Trade and Sustainability
Through the Lens of Nicaragua: How CAFTA-DR Should Be Amended to Promote the Triple
Bottom Line, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 653, 675 (2010) (discussing how
tariffs on certain goods such as automobiles, textiles, and electronics are eliminated, phased
out, or retained in order to reduce barriers to trade).
19
Nathaniel Hemmerick Hunt, Note, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: The Central
American Free Trade Agreement and the Environment, 35 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 545, 546
(2007).
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assurances that by fostering foreign direct investment (FDI), CAFTA would
lead to higher environmental and labor standards within the host nations.20
The proposal was met with considerable animus by both sides of the aisle in
Washington.21 Many members of Congress believed CAFTA would
replicate the problems for domestic jobs, international labor, and
environmental policy that were inherent in NAFTA.22 For example, while
supporters pointed to CAFTA as an opportunity to reaffirm and expand upon
the alleged successes of NAFTA, for some Republicans representing districts
heavily invested in manufacturing, textile, and sugar-production, the
agreement was perceived as a threat to American labor. They feared that U.S.
companies would be encouraged to outsource domestic jobs in order to
capture the benefit of the much lower wage expectations of citizens of the
host nations.23 In addition to sharing some of their Republican counterparts’
fear of CAFTA’s impact on the American workforce, Democrats premised
their opposition on the environmental and human rights degradations they
felt would likely ensue as result of the pact.24
Ultimately, CAFTA passed in the Senate by a vote of 54 to 45 on June
30, 2005.25 Further, after some hard bargaining and quid pro quo
concessions on particular textile manufacturing and importation interests,
CAFTA was passed on July 28, 2005 by a margin of two votes in the House
of Representatives.26 This narrow passage came amidst accusations by
Democrats that Republican leaders had “[bought] votes and forc[ed]
members to vote against their consciences” in order to push the trade pact
through a wary legislative body.27 Thus, after passing expeditiously, albeit
narrowly, through both the House and Senate, CAFTA was signed on August
2, 2005 by President Bush and officially debuted between nations in early
2006.28
20

Office of United States Trade Representative, Final Environmental Review of the
Dominican Republic – Central America – United State Free Trade Agreement 29 (2005),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/131461.pdf [hereinafter Final Environmental
Review].
21
Paul Blustein, CAFTA Wins Approval From Senate, WASH. POST, July 1, 2005, at D5.
22
Id.
23
Edmund L. Andrews, Pleas and Promises by G.O.P. As Trade Pact Wins by 2 Votes,
N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2005, at A1; see also Stenzel, supra note 18, at 683 (noting that host
nation Nicaragua’s minimum daily wage was $1.86 at the time of the article’s publication).
24
See, e.g., Barack Obama, Why I Oppose CAFTA, CHI. TRIB., at 27 (“[CAFTA] does
less . . . than previous trade agreements, and does little to address enforcement of basic
environmental standards in the [host nations].”).
25
Blustein, supra note 21.
26
See Andrews, supra note 23 (“Representative Nancy Pelosi . . . accused Republican
leaders of trading anything they had to get the votes they needed.”).
27
Id.
28
Stenzel, supra note 18, at 656; Mark Drajem, Bush Signs CAFTA, Capping 19-Month
Drive for the Trade Accord, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 4, 2012, 2:50 PM), http://www.bloomberg.

256

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 41:251

B. The Model BIT
Although structured multilaterally, CAFTA’s Chapter 10 may sometimes
be referred to as a bilateral investment treaty, or “BIT.”29 “BIT” is a catchall
term used to describe a type of treaty that obligates subject nations to “grant
investors from the other[s] certain protections to their investments in the
foreign country.”30 This term is particularly fitting, given that the language
of CAFTA Chapter 10 is culled directly from the U.S. Model BIT (Model
BIT),31 which “serves as a template for the investment chapters of free trade
agreements.”32
Before reviewing the CAFTA/Model BIT provisions
pertinent to this Note, for the sake of context, it is worth mentioning that,
despite the human rights and environmental benefits that free-market
proponents suggest flow naturally from the liberalization of international
trade,33 it is relatively well established that the primary objective of BITs is
to generate and protect FDI by developed nations’ corporations within
developing nations’ borders.34 As such, other benefits generally thought of
as humanitarian in nature, such as enhanced labor or environmental
protections, should realistically be understood as incidental to the strictly
economic benefits sought after by the parties to such agreements.
IV. INVESTOR PROTECTION UNDER CHAPTER 10
A. Three Important Provisions
“Investment” under CAFTA’s Chapter 10 is, as noted above, derived
from the 2004 Model BIT35 and is the product of a 2002 congressional
mandate directing U.S. trade negotiators to modify the language of future
free trade agreements in order to curb the United States’ potential exposure
to foreign investor suits.36 Three key provisions within CAFTA’s Chapter 10

com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=agWOlIZcvoHQ&refer=latin_america.
29
See, e.g., Amy K. Anderson, Note, Individual Rights and Investor Protections in a Trade
Regime: NAFTA and CAFTA, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1057, 1083 (2006) (referring to
CAFTA’s Chapter 10 as a BIT).
30
Anthony B. Sanders, Of All Things Made in America Why Are We Exporting the Penn
Central Test?, 30 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 339, 343 (2010).
31
Compare CAFTA, supra note 3, ch. 10, with 2004 Model BIT, U.S. DEP’T ST. [hereinafter
Model BIT], available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/117601.pdf.
32
Labor and Trade Program: The Language of International Trade, SIERRA CLUB, http://
www.sierraclub.org/trade/globalization/language.aspx (last visited July 12, 2012).
33
Final Environmental Review, supra note 20, at 29.
34
Sanders, supra note 30, at 347.
35
Compare CAFTA, supra note 3, ch. 10, with Model BIT, supra note 31.
36
Sanders, supra note 30, at 358–59.
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are National Treatment,37 Minimum Standard of Treatment,38 and
Expropriation and Compensation.39 These provisions are designed to offer
protection to investors, which in turn, expose nations to varied degrees of
potential liability in dealing with foreign corporations.40 The National
Treatment provision essentially requires that host nations treat foreign
investors in a manner “no less favorable than . . . it [treats] its own
investors.”41 This provision carries little threat to nations and does little to
change the status quo with respect to trading in the region because Latin
American nations have followed such a standard for some time.42 CAFTA’s
Minimum Standard of Treatment provision requires host nations to provide
foreign investors with “fair and equitable treatment and full protection and
security” in accordance with “customary international law.”43 The usage of
the qualifier “customary” in the 2004 Model BIT, and thus CAFTA, to
describe the application of “international law” in adjudicating disputes of this
nature was intended to preclude consideration of other treaties or even other
provisions within the Agreement.44 That has a potential dampening effect on
the likelihood of a foreign investor prevailing on an expropriation claim
arising under this Article.45 On the other hand, as demonstrated by
NAFTA’s track record,46 the Expropriations and Compensation provision
has, far more teeth than its counterparts in the Model BIT, and thus merits
greater attention.
CAFTA’s Expropriations and Compensation provision provides roughly
the same investor protections as those found in NAFTA’s homonymously
titled Chapter 1110.47 The effect of these chapters is that if a constituent
37

CAFTA, supra note 3, art. 10.3.
Id. art. 10.5.
39
Id. art. 10.7.
40
Id. arts. 10.3, 10.5, 10.7.
41
Id. art. 10.3.1.
42
Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief History of International Investment Agreements, 12 U.C.
DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 157, 159 (2005) (“Latin American countries adhered to the Calvo
doctrine, under which foreign investors were entitled only to the treatment that the host
country afforded to its own investors.”).
43
CAFTA, supra note 3, art. 10.5.1.
44
Sanders, supra note 30, at 356–57.
45
Stephen Fietta, Most Favoured Nation Treatment and Dispute Resolution Under
Bilateral Investment Treaties: A Turning Point?, 8 INT’L ARB. L. REV. 131, 137 (2005)
(discussing the danger of allowing foreign investors to replace “dispute resolution provisions
in the basic treaty with more advantageous provisions contained within another of the
respondent state’s BITs”).
46
See Metalclad v. United Mexican States, ICSID (Additional Facility) 40 I.L.M. 36 (2000)
[hereinafter Metalclad decision]; Methanex Corporation v. United States of America,
(NAFTA/UNCITRAL Aug. 3, 2005) (Final Award), 44 I.L.M. 1345 (2005) (awarding private
corporations significant sums in response to claims arising under the provision).
47
Compare CAFTA, supra note 3, art. 10.7, with NAFTA, supra note 5, ch. 1110.
38
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government “expropriates an investment[,] the government must provide
some measure of monetary compensation to the investor.”48 Two types of
expropriations, direct and indirect, are protected against and are analyzed
along the lines of U.S. Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence.49 A
government directly expropriates when it takes the tangible or intangible
property of a foreign investor via nationalization, i.e., “transfer of title or
outright seizure.”50 On the other hand, a government indirectly expropriates
the property of a foreign investor by taking some action along the lines of
those identified in U.S. regulatory takings jurisprudence.51 In the latter
context, CAFTA’s language differs ever so slightly from NAFTA’s as result
of the effort, noted above,52 to stem the United States’ potential liability
exposure to foreign investors. The difference is that NAFTA’s Article 1110
prohibits a nation from taking any “measure tantamount to nationalization or
expropriation,” whereas CAFTA’s Article 10.7 prohibits such measures that
are “equivalent to expropriation or nationalization.”53 The reasoning behind
the change in terminology stemmed from legislators’ and legal scholars’
concerns that arbitral panels might “interpret ‘tantamount’ expansively to
mean something much less than ‘expropriation.’ ”54 These concerns have
been proven unfounded over time.55 Alas, while the language of CAFTA’s
expropriation provision is, in effect, simply more of the same, a key
difference between the two can be found within its supplementary text.
Article 10.7 of CAFTA is to be read in light of Annexes 10-B and 10-C to
the Agreement, the latter of which further sets apart CAFTA’s indirect
expropriation language from that of NAFTA, beyond just the “tantamountequivalent” distinction.56 Annex 10-C more thoroughly expounds upon the
indirect expropriation cause of action than NAFTA by setting forth a series
of standards to assess such claims.57 Specifically, Annex 10-C states that, in
the instance of an alleged indirect expropriation:
48

Sanders, supra note 30, at 357–58.
Wang, supra note 8, at 261; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private
property be taken for public use without just compensation.”).
50
CAFTA, supra note 3, Annex 10-C.
51
See, e.g., Lucas v. S. Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (requiring the
government to compensate a private landowner for the deprivation of all economically
beneficial use as result of environmental regulation imposed on subject property).
52
See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
53
Compare NAFTA, supra note 5, ch. 1110, with CAFTA, supra note 3, art. 10.7.1
(emphasis added).
54
Sanders, supra note 30, at 360.
55
Id.
56
Stephen J. Byrnes, Balancing Investor Rights and Environmental Protection in InvestorState Dispute Settlement Under CAFTA: Lessons from the NAFTA Legitimacy Crisis, 8 U.C.
DAVIS BUS. L.J. 103 (2007).
57
CAFTA, supra note 3, Annex 10-C, ¶ 4(a)–(b).
49

2012]

BREAKING NAFTA’S HABITS

259

(a) The determination of whether an action or series of
actions by a Party, in a specific fact situation, constitutes
an indirect expropriation requires a case-by-case, factbased inquiry that considers, among other factors:
(i) the economic impact of the government action,
although the fact that an action or series of actions by
a Party has an adverse effect on the economic value
of an investment, standing alone, does not establish
that an indirect expropriation has occurred;
(ii) the extent to which the government action interferes
with
distinct,
reasonable
investment-backed
expectations; and
(iii) the character of the government action.
(b) Except in rare circumstances, nondiscriminatory
regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and applied
to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as
public health, safety, and the environment, do not
constitute indirect expropriations.58
Essentially, when an indirect expropriation (the international customary
law analog to a regulatory taking) is alleged, CAFTA has explicitly
incorporated the regulatory takings analysis established by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York.59 The Penn
Central test was included at the insistence of the Central American
governments.60 On its face, the Penn Central test should inure to the benefit
of nations seeking to retain policy setting autonomy, given that in the United
States private property owners seldom prevail in regulatory takings actions.61
Subsection (b) likewise is seemingly intended to allay concerns that foreign
property owners might have a better chance at winning such a case under the
Agreement than a domestic business or private individual property owner
would against the U.S. government, by stating that indirect expropriation will
rarely be found absent discriminatory regulatory actions taken by a party.62
Although the newly prescribed Penn Central test and subsequent proviso
as to the prospective rate of occurrences (in nondiscriminatory
circumstances) may, at first glance, appear significantly favorable to nations
58

Id.
Zaunbrecher, supra note 11, at 494; Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438
U.S. 104 (1978).
60
Zaunbrecher, supra note 11, at 494.
61
See Mark W. Cordes, The Effect of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island on Takings and
Environmental Land Use Regulation, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 337, 340 (2003) (“[T]he Penn
Central test is itself quite protective of government regulatory interest. . . .”).
62
CAFTA, supra note 3, Annex 10-C.
59
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looking to further human rights and environmental protection policies, they
are vulnerable to interpretations that cut the other way. First, there is an
argument that, within the United States, suits successfully litigated pursuant
to the Penn Central test are less than “rarely” won.63 A study conducted as
part of the 2003 Duke University Environmental Law and Policy Forum
indicated that, when the Penn Central test was used to assess regulatory
takings claims, “owners prevailed in 13.4% of the cases where the merits
were addressed and in 9.8% of all one hundred and thirty-three cases”
analyzed as part of the study.64 Using this data, legal scholar Anthony B.
Sanders suggests that phrases such as “extremely uncommon” or “very
unlikely” better describe the pattern of regulatory takings holdings in favor
of private property owners and that the term “rare” as it is used in Annex 10C might encompass greater, not fewer, instances in which an indirect
expropriation has occurred than would be the case had such claims arisen
between the U.S. government and its own constituents.65 A second argument
is that the test is being used out of context. The Penn Central test is intended
to reign in the arbitral panels’ “carte blanche review a la that imputed to the
Lochner court in deciding what is in the interest of the public welfare.”66
The test is applied out of the context of the case law and constitutional
principles of the United States, where it is derived; thus, in reality, panels
will not be assisted by the test in making their assessments.67 Accordingly,
arbitral panels may, in the absence of a meaningful case-based framework
for applying the Penn Central test, simply rely upon the reasoning of
decisions arising under NAFTA’s Chapter 1110,68 which have been more
generous to businesses than U.S. courts would be under a traditional takings
analysis.69
The harbinger of this phenomenon was the landmark case Metalclad
Corp. v. United Mexican States.70 It is no surprise, then, that Pac Rim
Cayman cited Metalclad as precedent for its case against the Salvadoran
government.71 In Metalclad, a California company, relying on NAFTA’s
63

Cordes, supra note 61, at 364.
F. Patrick Hubbard et al., Do Owners Have a Fair Chance of Prevailing Under the Ad
Hoc Regulatory Takings Test of Penn Central Transportation Company?, 14 DUKE ENVTL. L.
& POL’Y F. 121, 141 (2003).
65
Sanders, supra note 30, at 364.
66
Id. at 365.
67
Hunt, supra note 19, at 570.
68
See Rachel D. Edsell, Note, Indirect Expropriation under NAFTA and DR-CAFTA:
Potential Inconsistencies in the Treatment of State Public Welfare Regulations, 86 B.U. L.
REV. 931, 962 (noting that, in the absence of clear and practicable standards, investment
tribunal decisions often turn to prior NAFTA tribunals for their “persuasive power”).
69
Hunt, supra note 19, at 571.
70
Metalclad decision, supra note 46.
71
Archibold, supra note 7.
64
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investor provisions, successfully sued the Mexican government for allegedly
“thwart[ing] its efforts to build a hazardous waste treatment plant despite
assurances . . . that it would get the needed permits.”72 In addition to
damages totaling in excess of $16 million,73 the Metalclad decision delivered
a shift in paradigm.74 Investor-state disputes, hitherto largely thought of as a
way by which investors could ward off “the barrage of expropriations that
occurred in Third World nationalization of industries during the Cold
War,”75 were transformed into an aggressive gambit employed by investors
in order to induce host nations to relax their labor and environmental
policies.76
B. Arbitral Channels, Procedure, and the Problem of “Treaty-Shopping”
Under CAFTA, should a foreign investor decide to pursue compensation
from a host nation in connection with an alleged Chapter 10 violation under
the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) provision, it may do so
(a) under the ICSID Convention and the ICSID Rules of
Procedures for Arbitration Proceedings, provided that both the
respondent and the Party of the claimant are parties to the
ICSID Convention; (b) under the ICSID Additional Facility
Rules, provided that either the respondent or the Party of the
claimant is a party to the ICSID Convention; or (c) under the
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.77
The inclusion of an ISDS-type mechanism within a BIT was first adopted in
NAFTA78 and was heralded as an advancement in the resolution of
international trade disputes as it “grant[ed] individual foreign investors
standing to sue host governments without requiring the participation or
acquiescence of the investor’s home government . . . .”79
72

Id.
Metalclad decision, supra note 46.
74
Sanders, supra note 30, at 358.
75
Id.
76
Int’l Inst. for Sustainable Dev., Private Rights, Public Problems: A Guide to NAFTA’s
Controversial Chapter on Investment Rights 16 (2001), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/
trade_citizensguide.pdf (“Threats to use Chapter 11 are now a routine lobbying instrument,
and are given added impact by the broad scope tribunals have given the obligations in the
initial cases.”); see also Zaunbrecher, supra note 11, at 490–91 (noting that Metalclad opened
the door for indirect expropriations claims arising out of enactments of a “legitimate domestic
environmental policy”).
77
CAFTA, supra note 3, arts. 10.16.3(a)–(c).
78
NAFTA, supra note 5, ch. 1110.
79
Wang, supra note 8, at 260.
73
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The advantage to foreign investors extended even further in CAFTA as it
not only includes NAFTA’s array of available fora for resolving disputes, but
also follows suit in omitting that which NAFTA crucially lacks, namely, a
strict nationality standard.80 The result of this omission is that it allows a
multinational corporation to “change nationality or assert a different
nationality,” in order to “challenge generally applicable domestic
environmental law[s]” of a host nation, despite what would be that
corporations would ordinarily lack of standing based on their actual principal
place of business.81 An example of this type of posturing is found in the case
of Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States,82 wherein a Reno, Nevada-based
mining company “claim[ed] to be a Canadian foreign investor under NAFTA
in order to file a challenge over a mining claim available only to U.S.
residents that it had acquired through its domestic subsidiary.”83 Despite the
transparent, pretextual basis upon which Glamis Gold asserted jurisdiction,
the case was actually permitted to proceed.
Pac Rim Cayman’s investor suit against the Salvadoran government
further demonstrates the viability of this notion. Despite the nominal
character of the U.S.-based subsidiary Pac Rim established in order to
circumvent the host nation’s courts and the longstanding U.S. policy against
extending treaty rights to “third-party entities that may only as a matter of
formality be entitled to the benefits of a particular agreement,” the
corporation is being permitted to pursue its claim through ICSID
arbitration.84
For years, nations have sought to curtail the availability of this type of
maneuver, commonly referred to as “treaty shopping,” but the scope of these
effort has largely been limited to the issue of tax evasion.85 In the FTA
context, the failure to impose stringent anti-treaty-shopping measures may

80

See generally NAFTA, supra note 5.
Judith Wallace, Note, Corporate Nationality, Investment Protection Agreements, and
Challenges to Domestic Natural Resources Law: The Implication of Glamis Gold’s NAFTA
Chapter 11 Claim, 17 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 365, 366 (2005).
82
Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, Notice of Arbitration (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib.
Dec. 9, 2003), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/27320.pdf.
83
Todd Tucker, NAFTA Bullet Dodged in Flawed Glamis Case; Severe Threats Remain, PUB.
CITIZEN (June 9, 2009, 3:31 PM), http://citizen.typepad.com/eyesontrade/2009/06/nafta-bullet-do
dged-in-flawed-glamis-case-severe-threats-remain.html.
84
Pac Rim Cayman, L.L.C. v. Republic of El Salvador, Submission of the United States of
America, 2 (CAFTA Ch. 10 Arb. Trib. May 20, 2011) [hereinafter Submission of the United
States], available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/164308.pdf.
85
For instance, under NAFTA an entity must pass several threshold tests involving
calculable criteria before availing itself to beneficial tax treatment, whereas no such tests
apply to establishing jurisdiction when adjudicating investor-state disputes. See Simone M.
Haug, The United States Policy of Stringent Anti-Treaty-Shopping Provisions: A Comparative
Analysis, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 191, 247 (1996).
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reflect concerns expressed within the realm of tax treaties as to “the fact that
compliance complexity, or the fear of not qualifying for treaty benefits may
deter incoming investment.”86 On the other hand, it may reflect imbalances
in negotiating power, which sometimes means all “interests are not
adequately represented at the bargaining table” when FTAs are executed.87
The Pac Rim case seems to reinforce the idea that poorer host nations, in an
effort to attract and retain foreign direct investment, tend to shy away from
the treaty-shopping issue. Notwithstanding the aforementioned policy of
barring shell corporations’ access to investor tribunals,88 El Salvador has yet
to challenge the jurisdictional basis of the suit.89
Having covered the protections afforded to investors under CAFTA, a
look at how the agreement aims to ensure host nations protect the
environment will be necessary.
V. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION UNDER CHAPTER 17
Largely in response to concerns regarding the long-term environmental
impacts created by NAFTA in Mexico, subsequent FTAs entered into by the
United States have typically included an environmental chapter.90 As part of
this trend, CAFTA’s Chapter 17 addresses the member nations’ obligations
to protect the environment through regulatory enforcement,91 and was
described by the United States Trade Representative as “the most forwardleaning trade and environment package ever.”92 Despite the appearance of
“encourage[ing] high levels of environmental protection,”93 key omissions in
the Chapter’s language, the drawn out enforcement process, and an absence
of meaningful sanctions in the event of a violation make it relatively
feckless, perhaps by design.94
86

Id. at 278.
Hunt, supra note 19, at 548.
88
Submission of the United States, supra note 84, at 2.
89
See Pac Rim Cayman, L.L.C. v. Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12,
Respondent’s Preliminary Objections, ¶ 7 (Jan. 4, 2010), available at http://www.minec.gob.
sv/index.php?option=com_phocadownload&view=category&id=26:otros-documentos&Itemid=
63 (noting that El Salvador has reserved its right to challenge jurisdiction should arbitration
continue beyond Preliminary Objections).
90
Hunt, supra note 19, at 554–55.
91
CAFTA, supra note 3, ch. 17; U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement, ch. 19 (June 6, 2003),
available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/chile-fta/final-text.
92
Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Prot., 109th Cong. 25 (2005) [hereinafter
Subcommittee Hearing – Vargo] (prepared statement of Regina K. Vargo, Assistant United
States Trade Rep. for the Americas).
93
CAFTA, supra note 3, art. 17.1.
94
See Mark B. Baker, No Country Left Behind: The Exporting of U.S. Legal Norms Under
the Guise of Economic Integration, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1321, 1368 (2005) (“While
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A. Substantive Shortfalls
Article 17.1 of CAFTA states:
Recognizing the right of each Party to establish its own
levels of domestic environmental protection and environmental
development policies and priorities, and to adopt or modify
accordingly its environmental laws and policies, each Party
shall ensure that its laws and policies provide for and
encourage high levels of environmental protection, and shall
strive to continue to improve those laws and policies.95
Article 17.2.1(a), which is the enforceable provision of Chapter 17,96
asserts that “[a] Party shall not fail to effectively enforce its environmental
laws, through a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction, in a
manner affecting trade between the Parties, after the date of entry into force
of this Agreement.”97 In an expression of deference toward each party’s
respective environmental policy choices, Article 17.2.1(b) establishes that
each nation “retains the right to exercise discretion with respect to
investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory, and compliance matters and to make
decisions regarding the allocation of resources to enforcement with respect to
other environmental matters determined to have higher priorities.”98 While
this latter provision appears to reinforce the parties’ policy making
autonomy, in practice it might detract from environmental protection efforts
in several ways. First, this language arguably qualifies the Article 17.1
admonition that each nation “ ‘ensure’ substantial environmental
enforcement and protection . . .,”99 with the effect that the responsibilities
described in the Chapter become a matter of discretion.100 Even if this
phrase does not qualify 17.1, because 17.2.1(a) is the only enforceable
provision within the Chapter, language throughout it stating that “countries
should not weaken domestic environmental laws . . . and should ensure the
availability of fair and efficient judicial and administrative fora to sanction
violations of environmental law” is purely aspirational and without legal
negotiators claim that CAFTA only creates rights and obligations in this area which mirror
current U.S. Supreme Court decisions, environmental groups fear that the Agreement reduces
the permissible level of governmental regulation in environmental matters.”).
95
CAFTA, supra note 3, art. 17.1.
96
Id. art. 17.10.7 (“No Party may have recourse to dispute settlement under this Agreement
for any matter arising under any provision of this Chapter other than Article 17.2.1(a).”).
97
Id. art. 17.2.1(a).
98
Id. art. 17.2.1(b).
99
Hunt, supra note 19, at 556.
100
Id. at 557.
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effect.101 Further undercutting the parties’ obligations is the fact that under
Article 17.2.1(a), a party has violated such obligations only if its actions
constitute a “sustained or recurring course of action or inaction.”102 Thus, an
isolated violation of Chapter 17, “regardless of how egregious,” would
presumably be insulated from review.103
Because Chapter 17 looks to the parties to enforce their existing
regulatory standards, what is also missing in Chapter 17 is a set of standards
that would at least set a threshold for future policy choices.104 In contrast to
the Penn Central test under Chapter 10, which at least provides a universally
applicable ceiling above which a regulatory action might constitute
expropriation,105 Chapter 17 lacks a corollary floor below which nations
would be deemed to have failed in “encourage[ing] high levels of
environmental protection . . . .”106
“[T]he fact that only existing
environmental laws fall under the Agreement means that there is currently
very little to enforce”107 within the host nations, who tend to have weak
environmental protection laws on their books.108 Accordingly, a common
concern among environmentalists is that the deferential manner in which this
Chapter was drafted, although intended to encourage environmental
protection, will in the long run actually aggravate the problem of
environmental degradation throughout the region.109
Even if the host nations’ environmental laws were adequate and
sufficiently enforced, there is a specific carve out in Chapter 17 that not only
allows the host nations to relax such laws, but also seemingly encourages
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See Wang, supra note 8, at 271 (discussing CAFTA article 17.2.2 in particular).
CAFTA, supra note 3, art. 17.2(1)(a).
103
Hunt, supra note 19, at 556.
104
Id. at 557.
105
CAFTA, supra note 3, Annex 10-C.
106
Id. art. 17.1; see also Baker, supra note 94, at 1365–70 (discussing the United States’
grafting its own jurisprudential understandings of investor protection onto CAFTA but
declining to export domestic environmental and labor standards).
107
Benjamin W. Jenkins, Comment, The Next Generation of Chilling Uncertainty: Indirect
Expropriation under CAFTA and Its Potential Impact on Environmental Protection, 12
OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 269, 282 (2007).
108
See Office of the United States Trade Representative, Interim Environmental Review:
United States-Central America Free Trade Agreement 30, 31 (2003) [hereinafter Interim
Environmental Review], available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/CAFTA%20inter
im%20review.pdf (discussing the lack of existing environmental laws in force among some
host nations).
109
Stenzel, supra note 18, at 698; see also Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade
Agreement: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Prot. 109th
Cong. 107 (2005) [hereinafter Subcommittee Hearing – Waskow] (“Most countries in the
region have disjointed and underfunded policies that have led to severe environmental
degradation. [CAFTA] would only exacerbate the existing problems in the region. . . .”
(testimony of David F. Waskow, Director of the International Program, Friends of the Earth)).
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them to do so by virtue of the Chapter 10 consequences they might otherwise
face. Specifically, the term “ ‘environmental law’ does not include any
statute or regulation, or provision thereof, the primary purpose of which is
managing the commercial harvest or exploitation…of natural resources.”110
This not only facilitates the loosening of standards in order to attract foreign
investors engaged in exploitative industries, but also means that “government
efforts to manage the oil extraction, mining, and timbers sectors would not
be enforceable environmental law, and thus could be challenged by investors
seeking to enter natural resource markets.”111 Describing how this language
relates to Chapter 10, in a 2007 student note, Vivian Wang looked at a
dispute between Texas-based oil company Harken Energy Corporation and
the Costa Rican government regarding the latter’s moratorium on oil
exploration and certain types of mining activities within its borders due to
environmental concerns.112 Echoing existing legal scholarship on the matter,
Wang contemplated that, had CAFTA been in effect at the time of the
dispute, Harken likely would have been able to rely upon Chapter 10 as
guaranteeing protection against indirect expropriation.113 On the other hand,
she reasoned that, pursuant to Chapter 17’s exclusionary language, the Costa
Rican government would be left without a basis for its decision to stem
further environmental degradation caused by “commercial harvest or
exploitation” industries.114 Pac Rim’s action against the Salvadoran
government fits squarely within the Harken-Costa Rica dispute model,115 and
demonstrates the prescience of Wang’s and others’ analysis. While Pac Rim
has been free to allege a Chapter 10 breach, national Salvador’s
environmental concerns, specifically as to the threat of water and soil
contamination associated with the use of cyanide in the gold extraction
process,116 are not defensible under Chapter 17 by mere virtue of the industry
implicated.
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CAFTA, supra note 3, art. 17.13.1.
Wang, supra note 8, at 278.
112
Id.
113
Id. at 278–79.
114
Id. at 278; Jenkins, supra note 107, at 299–300; R. Victoria Lindo, Note, Hydroelectric
Power Production in Costa Rica and the Threat of Environmental Disaster Through CAFTA,
29 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 297, 311–13 (2006).
115
Of note, the U.S. Trade Representative has described both Costa Rica and El Salvador as
maintaining “full complement[s] of domestic environmental legislation. . . .” Interim
Environmental Review, supra note 108, at 30. Thus, at least with regard to the latter nation, it
appears that Chapter 17 has indeed failed “to provide an efficient mechanism for
environmental protection among CAFTA countries.” Hunt, supra note 19, at 555.
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Zaunbrecher, supra note 11, at 496–97.
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B. Procedural Impediments and Insufficient Sanctions
While a nation might be found liable for responding to valid
environmental concerns, it is unlikely to face serious consequences for
failing to do so. As mentioned above, Article 17.2.1(a), the only enforceable
provision within Chapter 17, can only be violated through a
“sustained . . . course of action,” meaning that one-time violations are free to
go unchecked.117 And, even [i]f a nation consistently “fails to enforce its
environmental laws and regulations, the complaint process is long and
involves many steps.”118
In an attempt to respond to “the need for greater transparency and
involvement of civil society in environmental decision-making,”119
CAFTA’s drafters included a public submissions mechanism,120 the first ever
to appear in the text of a FTA. The mechanism allows “[a]ny person of a
Party [to] file a submission asserting that a Party is failing to effectively
enforce its environmental laws.”121 Once filed, a claim is referred to an
appointed secretariat, who, as a preliminary matter, reviews it in order to
make determinations as to whether it contains “sufficient information” and is
“aimed at promoting enforcement rather than harassing industry.”122 Once a
claim passes such threshold inquiries, the secretariat next determines whether
further review of the submission would advance Chapter 17’s goals.123 If so,
the secretariat advises the Environmental Affairs Council (EAC),124
established under Article 17.5, on the matter.125 If the Council so directs, the
secretariat is then charged with developing a “factual record” consisting of
“relevant technical, scientific, or other information.”126 Once the factual
record is developed and submitted, “[t]he Council shall, as appropriate,
provide recommendations . . . related to matters addressed in the factual
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CAFTA, supra note 3, art. 17.2.1.(a).
Stenzel, supra note 18, at 687.
119
Subcommittee Hearing – Vargo, supra note 92, at 25.
120
CAFTA, supra note 3, art. 17.7.
121
Id. art. 17.7.1. Because of the availability of an alternative mechanism arising under
NAFTA, persons or organizations based in United States may not avail themselves to Chapter
17 in order to assert the United States has failed to effectively enforce its environmental laws.
Id. art. 17.7.3.
122
Id. art. 17.7.2. But see Subcommittee Hearing – Waskow, supra note 109 (“In a step
backward from NAFTA, the secretariat charged with oversight of citizen submissions is an
economic institution with no environmental expertise.”).
123
CAFTA, supra note 3, art. 17.7.4(b).
124
See id. art. 17.5 (establishing that the Council consists of “cabinet-level or equivalent
representatives of the Parties, or their designees.” It meets annually “[i]n order to share
innovative approaches for addressing environmental issues of interest to the public . . . .”).
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Id. art. 17.8.
126
Id. art. 17.8.4.
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record, including recommendations related to the further development of the
Party’s mechanisms for monitoring its environmental enforcement.”127 If
this process fails to yield results satisfactory to all parties, “the complaining
Party may request consultations under Article 20.4 (Consultations) or a
meeting of the Commission under Article 20.5 (Commission — Good
Offices, Conciliation, and Mediation) and, as provided in Chapter Twenty
(Dispute Settlement), thereafter have recourse to the other provisions of that
Chapter.”128 The Consultation precedes the Commission.129 If, after sixty
days from the commencement of the Article 20.4 Consultation, which
permits participation by both interested trade parties as well as “personnel of
[Parties’] government agencies or other regulatory bodies,”130 the matter
remains unresolved, the Article 20.5 Commission may be triggered.131 The
Commission, “consist[ing] of the cabinet-level representatives of the
consulting Parties . . . or their designees” gathers within ten days of notice of
the complaint and may engage topical experts for opinions on the matter, use
conciliation, mediation, or other dispute resolution mechanisms, and offer
recommendations to the parties with the aim of achieving “a mutually
satisfactory resolution of the dispute.”132 If the Commission fails to do so,
then an arbitration panel may finally be established to address the matter and
potentially award an assessment.133 The parties to the dispute first must
come to an agreement as to who will serve on the arbitration panel; each
party may propose up to seventy candidates, who must “have expertise or
experience in law, international trade, other matters covered by this
Agreement, or the resolution of disputes arising under international trade
agreements.”134 Environmental expertise is not a prerequisite to selection.135
Once again, experts may be called upon to provide opinions and, upon
submitting written notice, interested third parties may attend the hearing and
submit written and oral submissions that become part of the panel’s final
report.136
Even if a party is able to successful navigate the cumbersome
enforcement procedures, if a country is ultimately found to have failed to
enforce its environmental laws and regulations, a maximum sanction of $15
127

Id. art. 17.8.8.
Id. art. 17.10.6.
129
Id. art. 20.4.
130
Id. art. 20.4.6.
131
Id. art. 20.5.5, n.4.
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Id. art. 20.5.4.
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Id. art. 20.6.2.
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Id. art. 20.7.2.
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The secretariat to which the complaint is initially submitted also does not necessarily
possess environmental expertise. See Subcommittee Hearing – Waskow, supra note 109.
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million per year may be assessed against that nation.137 Despite initial
misgivings about the $15 million cap by members of the U.S. Trade and
Environmental Policy Advisory Committee (TEPAC),138 based on the
economic disparity of the signatory nations and the attending
“embarrassment of having such a penalty imposed,” TEPAC ultimately
determined it to be an appropriate figure.139 Not all commentators share
TEPAC’s view, however, and those who disagree point to more than just the
low dollar figure as indicative of CAFTA’s failure to seriously encourage
environmental protection.140 A key criticism of the assessment provision is
that sanctions are ultimately “returned to the violating [Party] for the
purposes of enhancing its enforcement,” and yet nothing stops that party
from allocating its existing enforcement funds elsewhere.141 This loophole
has been referred to as “an escape hatch that allows [violating parties] to use
enforcement resources as they see fit.”142 Therefore, despite the “forwardleaning” appearance of Chapter 17’s citizen submission mechanism,143 its
failure to address a nation’s reallocation of resources upon losing an
enforcement action (itself a Sisyphean endeavor), reinforces the contention
that it “does not provide for any clear outcomes or actions to actually ensure
that citizens of the region can achieve enforcement of environmental
laws.”144
C. Labor’s Lessons
A comparison of Chapter 17 to its companion Chapter 16, dealing with
labor standards, will shed further light on the former’s insufficiencies. Like
Chapter 17, Chapter 16 shows deference to the nations’ own prescribed labor
standards.145 The difference is that where Chapter 17 requires countries to
enforce only those laws currently in existence, Chapter 16 sets forth the
additional expectation that a nation’s labor laws will conform to those of the
137
See id. art. 20.17 (noting that, per Annex 20.17, while an initial $15 million cap is set, the
per annum assessment is adjusted to reflect the “accumulated U.S. inflation rate from calendar
year 2004 through the most recent calendar year preceding the one in which the assessment is
owed”).
138
See Wang, supra note 8, at 273 (TEPAC is “the advisory body of trade and
environmental sector representatives that provides expert opinions to Congress and the USTR
on trade policy issues”).
139
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
140
Stenzel, supra note 18, at 687 (noting that “$15 million . . . [is] a small amount as
compared to many companies’ operating expenses”).
141
Hunt, supra note 19, at 560.
142
Subcommittee Hearing – Waskow, supra note 109.
143
Subcommittee Hearing – Vargo, supra note 92, at 25.
144
Subcommittee Hearing – Waskow, supra note 109.
145
Compare CAFTA, supra note 3, art. 16.1, with CAFTA, supra note 3, art. 17.1.
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International Labor Organization (ILO).146 Those standards include the
rights of association and collective bargaining, along with other provisions
for establishing “minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety
and health.”147 Accordingly, by incorporating through reference of the ILO
standards, Chapter 16 establishes at least baseline criteria for determining
whether a nation is treating its workers equitably. In fact, whereas
environmental laws throughout the region are inconsistent and, in some
nations, virtually silent in key areas,148 the region’s corresponding labor laws
are not only considered adequate by ILO standards, but are also arguably
superior to those of other nations with whom FTAs have been sought and
approved by both congressional Democrats and Republicans.149
Even free trade advocates however, recognize that the true concern with
respect to labor standards in the region is not the black-letter law per se, but a
subpar enforcement record.150 To address the enforcement issue, CAFTA
established a “capacity building strategy” that included over $20 million in
U.S. appropriations going toward fostering “ ‘labor cooperation . . . fundamental
labor rights and the elimination of child labor, and improvement in labor
administration.’ ”151 And, Chapter 16, like Chapter 17, provides for a
submission mechanism to initiate research into an asserted violation of its lone
enforceable provision, Article 16.2.1(a),152 as well as for the availability of a
dispute resolution process in the event that preliminary attempts to rectify the
matter are unsuccessful.153 Again, a $15 million per annum fine may be
assessed against a party for violating its Chapter 16 obligations. And, because
146

Id.
Id. art. 16.8.
148
See, e.g., Interim Environmental Review, supra note 108, at 31 (noting that “Guatemala
has not passed a wide spectrum of environmental laws, and lacks specific laws dealing with
the major issues of water, forests, solid wastes, biodiversity, etc. that many of the other
countries possess”).
149
See Subcommittee Hearing – Vargo, supra note 92, at 24 (“[L]abor protections on the
books in the region are broadly similar to labor laws in Morocco, and in some areas (e.g.,
child labor) are stronger. Congress gave broad bipartisan support to an FTA with Morocco in
2004.”). But see Human Rights Watch, CAFTA’s Weak Labor Rights Protections: Why the
Present Accord Should be Opposed 2 (Mar. 10, 2004), http://www.hrw.org/legacy/english/do
cs/2004/03/09/usint8099_txt.pdf [hereinafter Human Rights Watch] (“Central America’s labor
laws currently fall far short of international standards. For example, in December 2003,
Human Rights Watch reported that El Salvador’s laws governing the right to freedom of
association do not adequately protect this right.”).
150
Subcommittee Hearing – Vargo, supra note 92, at 24.
151
Id. Some of the mentioned federal funds were generally directed at the environmental
and labor capacity building efforts and were left to discretionary allocation between the two.
Id. at 24–25.
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CAFTA, supra note 3, art. 16.6.7 (“No Party may have recourse to dispute settlement
under this Agreement for any matter arising under any provision of this Chapter other than
Article 16.2.1(a).”).
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Id. arts. 20.4, 20.5.
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there are no restrictions under Chapter 16 on reallocating resources, “there is
no guarantee that the end result will be a net increase in spending on initiatives
to protect workers’ human rights or remediation of the CAFTA breach that led
to the fine,” even though the assessed funds may be “used for ‘appropriate’
programs.”154
While CAFTA’s labor chapter is thus susceptible to much of the same
criticism as NAFTA’s Chapter 17, there is another labor enforcement
mechanism that does not appear in the text of the Agreement and simply
does not exist in the context of the environmental protection effort; namely,
the interplay between market forces and elected officials answerable to vocal
constituencies, particularly organized labor. It is axiomatic that in the effort
toward maximizing profits, businesses are constantly seeking to minimize
operating costs, a crucial component of which is the cost of labor. In a
strategy that is colloquially referred to as “labor arbitrage,” businesses are
able to realize greater profits by capturing the benefits of another country’s
lower labor compliance measures and wage standards than those upheld
domestically.155 CAFTA, at the time of its ratification, was seen as a boon to
U.S. business managers, because within the host nations laborers’ wages are
typically very low and workers have historically faced a great deal of
difficulty in unionizing.156 At the same time, because the jobs outsourced
under FTAs are unskilled labor positions, the legislators responsible for
facilitating such cost-cutting strategies remain answerable to domestic union
representatives, who are strongly opposed to CAFTA and other such
agreements due to the threat they pose to U.S. workers.157 As such, there is
arguably a greater drive to protect foreign labor interests implicated by the
Agreement, vis-à-vis the threats they pose domestically.
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Human Rights Watch, supra note 149, at 4.
Stenzel, supra note 18, at 696 (“Costs of labor are an essential factor in business
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historically repressive political and workplace environments).
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See Daniel P. Erikson, Central America’s Free Trade Gamble, WORLD POL’Y J., Winter
2004, at 19, 21.
Although environmental groups and human rights organizations have also
criticized the agreement, labor unions have been by far the loudest and most
effective voice in opposition. In essence, they argue that U.S. companies will
relocate their factories to Central America to take advantage of lower labor
costs and a weak regulatory environment that condones violations of labor
rights, which will result in the loss of good-paying U.S. jobs.
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Illustrative of this phenomenon is a complaint, initially filed by the
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations
(AFL-CIO) and six Guatemalan labor unions against Guatemala for its
alleged failure to enforce its labor standards pursuant to CAFTA Chapter 16,
which was accepted for further investigation and potential remedial efforts
by the U.S. Department of Labor’s Office of Trade and Labor Affairs
(OTLA) on April 23, 2008.158 The complaint alleged, among other
grievances, that “labor conditions in [Guatemala] have remained unchanged
or have worsened since [CAFTA] was ratified,” and that “[v]iolations of
freedom of association and collective bargaining continue apace, and access
to fair and efficient administrative or judicial tribunals remains elusive.”159
After conducting an eleven-month review of Guatemala’s compliance with
CAFTA Chapter 16, in a July 30, 2010 letter jointly addressed to the
economic and labor ministers of Guatemala, United States Trade
Representative Ron Kirk, officially requested the commencement of
consultations between the two nations.160 This letter made clear that, in light
of its “grave concerns” regarding Guatemala’s ongoing labor woes, the
United States would invoke CAFTA Chapter 20 (Dispute Settlement) in the
event such consultations proved fruitless.161 While it remains to be seen
whether and to what extent Guatemala may be found liable for failing to
uphold its Chapter 16 obligations,162 the United States’ movement from
investigation to consultations in this matter signals, at least for the time
being, an interest in helping “American workers by ensuring that [the]
nation’s trading partners live up to their promises”163 to enforce labor laws.
Thus, for U.S. lawmakers, particularly those situated in districts where the
retention of unskilled textile and manufacturing jobs is vital to the local
economy, working to ensure that host nations enforce fair labor standards
158
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Bush administration,” OTLA opted not to pursue consultations “despite significant weakness
in labor law enforcement”).
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may over time prove politically crucial,164 especially during a period of
floundering domestic employment rates.165
D. A Proposed Solution
Because mining for domestically unavailable sources of precious
resources abroad does not have a correlative impact on the U.S. unskilled
labor market, the political interest in labor protection likely will not
galvanize interest in environmental protection efforts. In fact, some
prominent right wing U.S. politicians have recently pointed to domestic
environmental protection as anathema to the health of the economy.166 For
instance, House Majority Leader Eric Cantor has referred to his and others’
outspoken criticism of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA)
policies as a component of what he considers a “legislative agenda that
boosts economic growth through reducing the regulatory and tax burden.”167
Although the calculus espoused by Representative Cantor and other
likeminded politicians is arguably lopsided from a cost–benefit
perspective,168 if not entirely myopic,169 it is clear that, due to economic
concerns, environmental protection has become less popular across the
political spectrum. Representative of this trend was President Obama’s
decision in September 2011 not to tighten U.S. ozone standards as
recommended by the EPA, in what was the agency’s attempt to mitigate the
easing of regulatory efforts by his predecessor, George W. Bush.170 In a
statement addressing his capitulation, President Obama stressed “the
importance of reducing regulatory burdens and regulatory uncertainty,
164
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particularly as our economy continues to recover.”171 It is thus clear that, for
at least the time being (and perhaps longer, if as result of the 2012 elections
Republicans end up controlling both the White House and the House of
Representatives), environmental protection is broadly perceived as costly and
of ancillary importance to the restoration of the United States’ economic
health.172
As such, other means of incentivizing oversight of CAFTA’s
environmental protection language should be considered. One such
mechanism would be the inclusion, within a side agreement that would be
binding on all parties, of a fee-shifting provision in the event a Chapter 20
dispute resolution proceeding becomes necessary. This could help fund the
efforts of citizen groups and non-governmental organizations with strong
cases to make, which might not otherwise be in the financial position to
conduct investigatory research and initiate consultations.173 And, if as it has
done pursuant to Chapter 16, the USTR became involved and spearheaded
the ultimate suit,174 it too would be entitled to recover, resulting in lower, if
any, net cost to the government.
A provision such as this might strengthen environmental protection
efforts within the host nations for several reasons. First, the cost of
defending allegedly violative actions would likely be much higher than the
cost of losing a Chapter 20 dispute as it is currently defined under the $15
million cap.175 Not only would the cost increase in terms of dollar amount, it
would increase appreciably. For, unlike the current scheme under which
damages flow back to the violating nation, which may reallocate its other
fiscal resources accordingly,176 the fee-shifting costs would flow outward to
other parties, meaning failure to comply with the agreement would result in
real loss. Lastly, acknowledging that progressive gestures are what led El
Salvador and Mexico down the path to Chapter 10 arbitration with foreign
investors,177 for host nations, stimulating the consultation and arbitration
processes might not actually pose a Hobson’s choice between protecting the
171
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environment and protecting fiscal resources. While it is not incumbent upon
them to do so, arbitral panels such as ICSID often give at least quasiprecedential consideration to decisions relevant to the dispute under
review.178 Therefore, a nation’s compelled or negotiated compliance under a
Chapter 17 suit might carry a preclusive effect in a later investor suit arising
under Chapter 10.
Drafters could graft the cost-shifting language of existing international
agreements onto CAFTA. For example, the International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC) Rules of Arbitration provides for a scale-based assessment
of costs to be determined by the arbitrator and then allocated to either or both
parties in accordance with the issuance of its Final Award.179 In fact, this
type of arrangement has been bolstered domestically for the same purposes
as described above, further suggesting the feasibility of such a regime.180
VI. CONCLUSION
Suits like the one in which Pac Rim and El Salvador are currently
embroiled illustrate the problematic drafting of FTAs to which the United
States is a party. For instance, CAFTA’s investor protection language, while
containing greater specificity than NAFTA, still fails to set a reliable
standard for assessing when a host nation’s actions constitute an indirect
expropriation. As such, tribunals will likely continue to look to decisions
arising under NAFTA, which tend to strongly favor the interests of foreign
investors over host nations, for guidance in their decision making process.
As further illustrated by the Pac Rim suit, private corporations hailing from
nations that are not party to the agreement are able to avail themselves of the
investor-friendly fora by setting up shell corporations in the United States, a
relatively simple means of forum shopping that strongly enhances their
chances of success in suing the host nation. A side agreement should be
drafted to incorporate a standard for selecting arbitral panels to ensure
greater substantive objectivity, as well as a threshold standard that must be
satisfied by a foreign investor in order to obtain jurisdiction under the
agreement.
CAFTA’s environmental protection language is also in need of change.
The process of bringing a suit against a nation for failing to uphold and
enforce its environmental standards is lengthy. And, even if that nation is
178
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found liable, the end result is nominal at best, since the damages assessed
ultimately flow back to the violating nation for remediation purposes, and
damagers are capped at a low ceiling and without restrictions against that
nation reallocating other fiscal resources in the meantime. Therefore, no net
gain in environmental protection funding is ensured, and there is little
impetus for improvement because damages are artificially suppressed to such
a degree as to lack any deterrent effect. The aforementioned side agreement
should contain a cost-shifting provision to encourage greater oversight and
participation by non-governmental organizations within party nations, as
well as to change the currently illusory threat of damages in the event of a
violation into a formidable one. This would likely assuage conservative
thinkers concerned that environmental protection is too costly. Additionally,
complying with judgments rendered in such suits might preclude foreign
investors from bringing expropriation claims in the first place.

